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It is now well established in the adult literature that the ability to engage in flexible thought and action
is a complex skill that relies on a number of underlying processes. The development of this skill has
received growing interest in recent years. However, theories explaining children’s ability to switch
between different tasks typically focus on a single underlying process and are rarely extended to
explain development beyond the preschool years. This article reviews the current literature on set
shifting in children in comparison with task switching in adults, in order to highlight the range of
factors that impact on children’s ability to flexibly shift between tasks. In doing this we hope to set
the scene for future research that can begin to establish the relationships between these processes
and how they change with age.
Keywords: Flexibility; Task switching; Shifting; Executive function; Cognitive control; Development;
Children.

One of our most important skills as humans is the
ability to quickly and flexibly adapt to an everchanging environment, overcoming habitual, prepotent responses in order to engage in purposeful,
goal-directed behaviours. This ability is known as
cognitive control, or executive function. One of
the hallmarks of this kind of behaviour is the
ability to flexibly switch between different tasks,
commonly termed set shifting or cognitive flexibility. Shifting is considered as one of the main
components of cognitive control, along with
working memory updating (the ability to manipulate and act on information held in mind) and
inhibition (suppressing distracting information
or inappropriate responses; Huizinga, Dolan, &

van der Molen, 2006; Miyake et al., 2000). Set
shifting is particularly difficult when the same
stimuli require different responses depending on
the context, such as closing a document in the
top left or right hand corner of a computer
screen, depending on the operating system.
Although we are capable of matching the required
response to the changing situation, a deficit in
performance is often evident when a shift is
made, known as a switch cost.
Set shifting has been extensively, yet separately,
investigated in both adults and children. This
research has revealed that set shifting has a protracted development from the early preschool
years to adulthood, and even in adulthood
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switching task sets comes with a cost in terms of
slower performance. However, the independence
of these lines of research has resulted in the use
of completely different paradigms with children,
especially preschoolers, and adults. It has also led
to different theoretical accounts of flexibility
development and set shifting in adults.
In this article we review the current developmental literature on shifting with reference to
the adult task-switching literature, comparing
the processes that contribute to flexibility in
different age groups. By examining the range
of processes that have been identified in adults,
we can see the implications these have for developmental theories and identify factors that may
be subject to developmental change. Areas
where further developmental research is required
can also be identified. In this way, we hope that
this review can be used to move forward and
extend existing research to target how shifting
processes change with age, furthering our understanding of the development of flexible thought
and action. We begin with a comparison of the
different paradigms used in adult and developmental research before addressing the obstacles
and control processes that contribute to set
shifting.

Paradigm comparison
A number of paradigms have been developed to
measure set shifting in both children and adults.
Probably the most well known measure of flexibility is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948). In this test, participants are given a deck of cards displaying 2 – 4
coloured shapes. They have to sort the cards first
according to one dimension (colour, shape, or
number) and, following a certain number of
trials, switch to sort by a different dimension. In
many versions, the participant is not told when
the rule changes, but has to infer this using
feedback given by the experimenter. In recent
years, the WCST has become less popular,
and researchers have extensively used the taskswitching paradigm in both adults and, more
recently, school-age children (see Meiran, in
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press; Monsell, 2003, for a review of the adult
task-switching literature).
In the task-switching paradigm, the participant is presented with a bidimensional stimulus
that contains properties of both tasks. They are
required to switch back and forth between tasks,
based on either cues or sequence position information. Traditionally, participants alternate
between simple blocks of trials with minimal
flexibility demands, where the same task is to be
performed across all trials, and mixed blocks in
which they must alternate between two or more
tasks from trial to trial. These blocks are heavily
demanding in terms of set shifting. There are
two main versions of the task-switching paradigm. In the alternating-runs version, participants have to switch between tasks in the mixed
blocks on the basis of a predictable sequence of
tasks (e.g., Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B).
In the cueing procedure, tasks alternate unpredictably, and participants must rely on external cues
(e.g., words) to decide on which task is relevant
on each trial. Switch costs have been repeatedly
observed on this paradigm. Adults generally
perform better on simple blocks than mixed
blocks and in turn on no-switch trials than
switch trials.
In contrast, flexibility has mainly been investigated in preschoolers using paradigms reminiscent
of the WCST, in which the children must sort
cards (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo,
Frye, & Rapus, 1996; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, &
Marcovitch, 2003), or choose items (Chevalier &
Blaye, 2008; Deák, 2000; Espy, 1997; Espy &
Cwik, 2004; Jacques & Zelazo, 2001; Smidts,
Jacobs, & Anderson, 2004), on the basis of
various perceptual features, typically colour and
shape. The Dimensional Change Card Sort
(DCCS; Frye et al., 1995; Zelazo, 2006) is
undoubtedly the most widespread of such paradigms. In the first phase of the DCCS, children
are explicitly instructed to sort cards according to
a specific dimension (e.g., colour). In the second
phase, children are required to switch and use
the alternative dimension (shape) to sort the
cards. It is now well documented that most 3year-old children succeed in maintaining an
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initial sorting dimension over the first phase but
fail at switching dimension in the second phase,
instead perseverating on the initial criterion.
In contrast, most 4- and 5-year-old children successfully switch dimension, hence behaving flexibly (e.g., Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003;
Kloo & Perner, 2005; Zelazo et al., 2003). Such
a progress in set shifting occurring between 3
and 5 years of age has been confirmed by similar
age trends observed on other tasks including the
Preschool Attentional Switching Task (PAST;
Chevalier & Blaye, 2008) and Flexible Induction
of Meaning task (FIM; Deák, 2000).
Fewer studies have been performed with schoolaged children; however, these tend to use either
versions of the task-switching paradigm (Cepeda,
Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; Cragg &
Nation, 2009; Huizinga et al., 2006; Kray, Eber,
& Lindenberger, 2004; Reimers & Maylor, 2005)
or the WCST (e.g., Chelune & Baer, 1986;
Huizinga & van der Molen, 2007; Welsh,
Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). Some studies
have adapted the DCCS for use with older
children, combining the stimuli used in the
preschool task with multiple switches, more
similar to the task-switching paradigm. This is
known as the Advanced DCCS (Carlson, 2005;
Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier, Blaye, Dufau,
& Lucenet, 2009a; Hongwanishkul, Happaney,
Lee, & Zelazo, 2005).
Although there are basic similarities between
shifting paradigms used with children and adults,
there are many factors that differ. Comparison
across age groups is hindered by such differences
in paradigms. In the following section we compare
different versions of set-shifting paradigms to highlight the similarities and differences and the implications this has for drawing comparisons about
underlying processes.
Stimuli
One of the most consistent features of shifting
paradigms across adult and developmental research
is the presence of multivalent stimuli, which vary
on at least two dimensions (i.e., red and blue
rabbits and boats). The stimuli remain the same
across the tasks, and the tasks are formed by

making decisions about different dimensions of
the stimuli. The overlap between tasks at a stimulus level creates conflict between the tasks, which
needs to be overcome in order to switch between
them. The presence of bivalent stimuli has been
found to be a crucial feature of the switching
tasks. When tasks use different stimuli or univalent stimuli are used, switching becomes trivially
easy, shown by a drastic reduction of switch costs
in adults (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Jersild,
1927; Meiran, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995)
and a substantial increase in the number of 3year-olds who can successfully pass the DCCS
(Perner & Lang, 2002; Zelazo et al., 2003).
The dimensions typically used with preschoolers and older children are colour and shape,
similar to the WCST. In the task-switching paradigm used with adults a variety of tasks have been
used, including identifying the word or colour of
Stroop stimuli (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Allport
& Wylie, 2000; Wylie & Allport, 2000), making
decisions about the horizontal or vertical location
of a circle in a grid (e.g., Meiran, 1996, 2000)
and deciding whether letters are vowels or consonants and numbers odd or even in letter – number
combinations (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995;
Sohn & Carlson, 2000). Moreover, developmental
studies tend to use two exemplars of each dimension, whereas studies with adults use a larger set
of stimuli. These differences have a number of
implications. First, it may be easier to selectively
attend to perceptual rather than semantic properties (Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Martin, 2004).
Indeed, it is easier for school-age children to maintain or switch to thematic rules that can be easily
conceptualized than it is to maintain or switch to
hard-to-conceptualize taxonomic rules (Blaye,
Bernard-Peyron, Paour, & Bonthoux, 2006;
Blaye, Chevalier, & Paour, 2007; Blaye &
Jacques, 2009; Maintenant & Blaye, 2008).
Secondly, with a small set size, specific stimulus – response associations rather than task-level
associations may be employed (Kray & Eppinger,
2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The extent to
which task type and set size influence shifting
performance across the lifespan has not yet been
systematically investigated.
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Responses
In addition to overlapping stimuli, the same
responses are typically used for both tasks in shifting paradigms, creating an extra level of competition. This is the case in the task-switching
paradigm, where the same two button press
responses are used for both tasks. It is also the
case in the DCCS, where cards are sorted into
the same two boxes. Some paradigms for preschoolers, in which the relevant dimension is
labelled (Shape School; Espy, 1997) or the object
in the correct colour chosen (PAST; Chevalier &
Blaye, 2008) tend to have univalent responses,
suggesting that the competition between tasks
may be partially reduced in these paradigms,
although they remain challenging for preschoolers.
Number of switches
Whereas the use of bivalent stimuli and responses
tends to be a consistent feature across shifting paradigms, there are a number of other aspects that
differ depending on the age of the participant.
One such aspect is the number of switches that participants are required to make. In the DCCS and
PAST, children perform one task for a number of
trials and are then asked to switch only once to
perform the alternative task. Ceiling performance
on these paradigms is observed by 4 or 5 years,
yet the Advanced DCCS, which requires more
than one switch, demonstrates that once children
master a single switch they still have difficulty
switching back and forward between the same
two tasks (Carlson, 2005; Hongwanishkul et al.,
2005). Other paradigms that involve several successive switches have shown that set-shifting performance continues to improve. For instance, in the
Object Classification Task for Children (OCTC;
Smidts et al., 2004), participants must switch
twice among object-sorting criteria based on
shape, size, and colour. Similarly, on the Flexible
Item Selection Task (FIST; Jacques & Zelazo,
2001), children are presented with several triads
of pictures. One pivot picture matches each of
the two other pictures on different dimensions
(shape, colour, or size) while the two nonpivot pictures match on none. For each triad, children must
make two successive selections of pictures that “go
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well together”, hence leading to several switches
among the three dimensions throughout the task.
These tasks have been used with children up to
the age of 7 years, at which stage ceiling performance has not been reached.
It has been argued that it is easier to consistently
inhibit a task rather than repeatedly inhibit/activate
the same task (Diamond, 2009). However, the
difference between requirements to switch only
once or several times has been overlooked in the
preschool literature. The distinction may be an
important one, as switching back and forth requires
the additional process of reactivating a task that was
previously abandoned and supposedly inhibited.
Therefore, taking the number of switches into
account has the potential to more accurately
capture the complex dynamics of task switching.
Goal setting
Measures used with preschoolers and those used
with older participants also strongly differ in the
way a switch is instructed. As a result, their goalsetting demands, deciding which task is relevant
on a given trial, differ. As the necessity of switching
and the relevant task are explicitly announced and
repeated before each trial on the DCCS and
PAST, these measures are not demanding in
terms of goal setting. In contrast, the measures
yielding performance improvement after 4 years
are more difficult in this respect since children
must decide on their own which task is relevant
and when a switch must be implemented. This is
similar to the task-switching paradigms used with
adults.
The instruction to switch is also indicated differently depending on the specific features of the
measures. For example, on the Advanced DCCS
(Carlson, 2005; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005), children must switch back and forth between sorting
test cards by shape and colour on the basis of a
visual cue (e.g., a thick border cues colour
whereas a thin one signals shape). Similarly, in
the Shape School (Espy, 1997), children must
name hatless pictures according to their colour
and hatted pictures according to their shape.
In such cases, goal setting relies on cue– goal translation (e.g., Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn,
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2004). The cues used in different paradigms often
vary in how informative they are of the upcoming
task. In other situations, task goals must be set on
the basis of a alternating sequence, as in the
TRAILS-P, an adaptation of the Trail Making
Test in which children must alternate between
stamping dogs and bones from the smallest to
the biggest (Espy & Cwik, 2004). These two
types of goal setting are also involved in two versions of the task-switching paradigms used in
adults: cued task-switching and alternating-runs
paradigms, respectively. Comparison of switch
costs computed using these two paradigms shows
that their magnitude differs and suggests that
they may, at least partially, relate to nonoverlapping processes (Altmann, 2007), possibly related
to differences in goal setting. Finally, other
measures require inferring relevant task goals on
the basis of feedback (e.g., WCST), predicate
cues (FIM), or even no specific information (children are only told to switch to a new task; e.g.,
FIST, OCTC), which may also involve different
processes.
Dependent variables
The main dependent variable measured in different paradigms typically varies depending on the
age of the participant. Switch costs in adults and
older children are demonstrated in reaction times
(RTs), although accuracy is also measured. In contrast, the main dependent variable in preschoolers
is accuracy. Furthermore, whereas accuracy is
assessed in terms of percentage correct or
number of errors in older preschoolers and
school-age children, it is often indexed as a pass/
fail criterion in younger preschoolers. An important question when comparing paradigms is
whether these different dependent variables are
capturing the same processes, just expressed in
different ways, or whether they may reflect different aspects of the task. To facilitate comparison,
both accuracy and RT information should be

collected in all age groups where possible.
Differences largely seem to occur because adults
tend to slow down their performance to avoid
making errors, whereas children do not.
Therefore one possibility to directly compare children and adults on the same dependent variable
would be to restrict the amount of time adults
are given to respond, forcing them to make errors.
A number of different indices can be measured
in shifting paradigms, taking advantage of both
accuracy and RT data. For example, the taskswitching paradigms offer the possibility of computing different switch-cost indices that specifically target different processes. Mixing costs
contrast performance on single-block trials (the
same task is relevant across all trials) to performance on no-switch trials from mixed blocks (trials
for which the relevant task repeats). These are
termed global costs when they are computed
including all trials from mixed blocks. Mixing
costs are assumed to reflect the difficulty of maintaining two task sets in working memory and
setting the relevant task goal (e.g., Reimers &
Maylor, 2005; Rubin & Meiran, 2005). Local
costs compare performance on switch and noswitch trials within mixed blocks and are thought
to reflect the difficulty of implementing a switch
in task set per se (e.g., Rubin & Meiran, 2005).1
Consistent with the claim that mixing and local
costs reflect different processes, they have been
found to be sensitive to different variables. For
instance, mixing costs, but not local costs, are
affected by stimulus ambiguity (Rubin &
Meiran, 2005) and articulatory suppression
(Bryck & Mayr, 2005). Developmental studies
have also shown that the two costs reflect different
processes, with evidence of different developmental trajectories. Reimers and Maylor (2005)
observed a developmental evolution for mixing
switch cost with a decrease between 10 –11 years
of age and 16– 17 years and an even increase
from late adolescence to late adulthood, whereas

1
The concept of task set is widespread in the literature but very imprecise. However, it is commonly assumed to encompass a
number of parameters related to perceptual, mnemonic, attentional, and motor processes that are essential for a given task goal
(e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schneider & Logan, 2007). A task set allegedly includes stimulus encoding, action rules, and response
selection (e.g., Gade & Koch, 2007; Rogers & Monsell, 1995).
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local cost remained relatively stable across all age
groups.
The computation of local costs and mixing
costs allows a much finer grained examination of
the processes underlying flexibility than the pass/
fail criteria (e.g., standard and Advanced DCCS,
PAST) or global efficiency scores (e.g., Shape
School, Trails-P) traditionally used in paradigms
for preschoolers. Yet, the features of some of
these paradigms (Advanced DCCS, Shape
School) would allow the computation of such
indices. The systematic investigation of local and
mixing costs in such paradigms would not only
further characterize the processes involved in paradigms for preschoolers but would also facilitate
comparison across ages, hence leading to a more
unified picture of flexibility development form
early childhood to adulthood.
Different processes can also be identified from
patterns of errors when more than two tasks are
switched between. In paradigms that involve
switching between only two tasks (e.g., taskswitching paradigm, DCCS, Shape School) participants can either respond correctly, interpreted
as a mark of flexibility, or perseverate on the previously relevant (but now irrelevant) response.
When more than two tasks are used (e.g.,
WCST, PAST-3, OCTC, FIM), it provides the
opportunity to observe other types of behaviour.
For instance the WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948)
requires switching among three different sorting
dimensions (colour, shape, and number). In this
paradigm, perseverative errors can be distinguished
from nonperseverative errors such as failure-tomaintain-set errors (occurring after a series of
correct responses) or distraction errors, where a
different dimension is selected from the one that
has just been negatively reinforced (Barceló &
Knight, 2002).
Perseverative and nonperseverative errors have
been shown to be differently distributed in
prefrontal patients and healthy adults (Barceló &
Knight, 2002) and to follow different developmental courses (Chevalier & Blaye, 2008; Crone,
Ridderinkhof, Worm, Somsen, & van der Molen,
2004; Huizinga & van der Molen, 2007; Somsen,
2007), suggesting that they result from failure of
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divergent processes. These findings are particularly
valuable in the preschool literature because the use
of paradigms with only two response options had
lured developmentalists into believing that all
manifestations of preschoolers’ lack of flexibility
were perseverative in nature. This led to theories
that accounted only for perseverative tendencies.
Yet as these results and others suggest, preschoolers’ lack of flexibility cannot be reduced to perseveration but instead is multidetermined.
Summary
Large differences in the paradigms used with children and adults necessarily occur due to the capabilities of the two age groups. These differences are
summarized in Table 1. For preschoolers just
beginning to demonstrate flexibility, an accuracy
measure of a single switch is sufficient to assess
their abilities, whereas in adults, for whom this is
trivially easy, only the speed at which they can
perform multiple successive switches reveals their
limitations.
Direct comparison between research in preschoolers and adults is hampered by these differences; however, there are enough similarities
between paradigms to undertake some comparison. This could be facilitated in future research
by always including both accuracy and RT as
dependent variables and measuring variables such
as mixing costs and local switch costs, as well as
categorizing different kinds of errors. However,
in order to gain a better understanding of how
flexibility develops, it is essential that more
studies directly comparing different age groups
are performed. Using paradigms similar to both
the DCCS and adult task-switching paradigm,
such as the Advanced DCCS, has a great deal to
contribute to this area of research. It is also important to parametrically manipulate factors that
differ across current paradigms in both children
and adults, such as the tasks used and goalsetting demands, in order to determine the influence they have on shifting performance at different
ages. This will enable comparison across situations
that are as similar as possible and also lead to the
development of new measures that can be used
across the lifespan.
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Table 1. A summary of some widespread shifting paradigms used with adults and children

Wisconsin Card Dimensional
Task-switching
Sorting Test
Change Card
paradigm
(WCST)
Sort (DCCS)
Age group

Response
valence
Dependent
variable

Object
Classification
Task for
Children
(OCTC)

Flexible
Induction of
Meaning
(FIM)

TRAILS-P

adults and
adults and
3- to 6-year- adults and
3- to 6-yearchildren
children
olds
children
olds
over 5 years
over 5 years
over 5 years
two
three
two
two
two

3- to 6-yearolds

3- to 6-yearolds

3- to 7-year- 3- to 63- to 5-yearolds
year-olds
olds

three

three

three

three

bivalent

trivalent

two (three on
PAST-3)
bivalent

trivalent

trivalent

univalent

trivalent

bivalent

bivalent

bivalent

computer
cards
cards
computer
booklet
manual button place card with place card
manual button label relevant
press
target card
with target
press
dimension
card

bivalent

bivalent

bivalent

bivalent

univalent

RT and
accuracy

accuracy, error
types

accuracy

RT and
accuracy
incongruent

accuracy and
completion
time
incongruent

many

many

Stimulus
congruent and congruent and incongruent
incongruent
incongruent
congruency
Number of
many
many
one
switches
Indication of
switch

Shape School

Flexible Item
Selection Task
(FIST)

Preschool
Attentional
Shifting Task
(PAST)

cue presented
in advance
of the
stimulus or
alternating
rule, e.g.,
AABB
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Note: RT ¼ reaction time.

switches must
be inferred
from
feedback or
told of
switch but
must infer
new task
(Nelson,
1976)

the switch
arbitrary cue
and
presented
newly
with
relevant
stimulus
task are
explicitly
announced

arbitrary cue
presented
with
stimulus

cards
select two
cards that
match on
relevant
dimension
bivalent

computer
objects
objects
booklet
manual button group objects manual
manual
press
according
object
stamping
to relevant
selection
dimension
univalent

univalent

univalent

univalent

accuracy

accuracy

accuracy

accuracy

RT and
accuracy

incongruent

congruent and incongruent incongruent incongruent
incongruent
one switch for one
two
many
many
each triad;
many triads
switches are
the switch and switches are switches
switches
explicitly
newly
explicitly
must be
depend on
announced
relevant task
announced
inferred
an
but
are explicitly
but
from
alternating
children
announced
children
predicate
rule
must infer
must infer
cues
the newly
the newly
relevant
relevant
task
task
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Number of
tasks
Stimulus
valence
Presentation
Response

Advanced
Dimensional
Change Card
Sort
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The wide array of paradigms used to assess set
shifting in children may give a fragmented
picture of its development; however, they also
point out the diversity of the processes underlying
flexibility. Specifying and taking advantage of the
differences between paradigms can help to tease
apart the different processes that contribute to
developmental improvements in flexibility. We
now move on to a discussion of these processes.

Processes contributing to flexibility
A number of theories have been proposed to
account for the emergence of the ability to shift
task in the preschool years (e.g., cognitive complexity and control theory, Zelazo et al., 2003;
attentional-inertia theory, Kirkham et al., 2003;
active/latent-representation theory, Morton &
Munakata, 2002; object-redescription theory,
Kloo & Perner, 2003). Although these theories
sometimes acknowledge that multiple processes
underlie switching, they typically argue that
changes in a single process drive developmental
improvement in switching. Moreover, they have
rarely been extended to explain developmental trajectories beyond preschool years. Despite knowing
that set shifting continues to develop into the
teenage years (Chelune & Baer, 1986; Crone,
Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, & Bunge,
2006; Crone et al., 2004; Huizinga & van der
Molen, 2007; Welsh et al., 1991), comparatively
little research has been undertaken to investigate
factors affecting shifting performance in schoolaged children and adolescents. As a result, these
theories only explain the beginnings of the switching ability, rather than the extended developmental trajectory.
Many theories have been proposed to account
for switch costs in adulthood, pointing out the
role of processes and phenomenon such as active
task set configuration (Rogers & Monsell, 1995),
proactive interference remaining from having
recently performed the alternative task (Allport
et al., 1994), activation of the relevant, and suppression of the irrelevant, task set (Allport et al.,
1994; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Meiran,
1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), and filtering
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task-irrelevant information (Mayr & Bryck,
2007; Meiran, 2000; Rubin & Meiran, 2005), as
well as goal maintenance and performance monitoring (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001;
Gruber & Goschke, 2004; Miyake et al., 2004).
Although these processes have the potential to
shed new explanatory light on set-shifting development, they have not systematically been investigated in a developmental context. In the present
section we discuss the main processes that have
been identified in the developmental and adult literature and integrate findings from both of these
lines of research.
Task decision and goal setting
When switching task, one of the first processes
involved is selecting the appropriate task set.
Although task sets are poorly defined, they are
often thought to include elements related to task
goals, task rules, stimulus encoding, and response
selection, as well as parameters linked with perceptual, attentional, mnemonic, and motor processes
(e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000; Rogers & Monsell,
1995). Among the elements included in task sets,
task goals have been given a specific status. Many
authors have proposed theories of set shifting
that include both a component dedicated to goal
setting and a component for switching task set
per se (Baddeley et al., 2001; Fagot, 1994, as
cited in Allport & Wylie, 2000; Gruber &
Goschke, 2004; Emerson & Miyake, 2003;
Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). Although
these theories diverge regarding details and terminology, they all agree with the claim that successful
set shifting requires (a) determining which task
goal is relevant and, if it is different from the previous one, (b) implementing a switch in task set
(i.e., reorienting attention to the newly relevant
information, selecting the correct response, and
so on).
One such theory (Gruber & Goschke, 2004)
distinguishes two distinct systems allegedly
involved in set shifting. One of these systems is
thought to depend on prefrontal-parietal and prefrontal-temporal cortex and would be used to temporarily maintain task-relevant information and
“to exert top-down control by regulating and
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modulating activity in different domain-specific
sensory association areas” (p. 111). This would
be achieved through activation of brain areas that
process task-relevant information and inhibition
of brain areas that process task-irrelevant information. The other system is assumed to rely on
parietal and left premotor cortex and would be
strongly associated with verbal rehearsal and
inner speech. This system is allegedly involved in
setting and maintaining verbal representations of
task goals, especially when the relevant task goal
is new. Goal setting is thought to be intrinsically
dependent on inner speech and verbal memory.
Goal setting has also been shown to contribute
substantially to performance on the task-switching
paradigm. In the cued paradigm, goal setting has
been hypothesized to be achieved using inner
speech to translate task cues into verbal representations of task goals. Consistent with this hypothesis, Miyake et al. (2004) observed a detrimental
effect of verbal dual tasks, such as articulatory suppression (e.g., repeating “the”), on switch costs
whereas nonverbal dual tasks did not affect adults’
performance. In addition, the effect of articulatory
suppression on switch costs was reduced when arbitrary or poorly transparent task cues (e.g., “S” for a
shape-matching task and “C” for a colour-matching
task) were replaced with more transparent ones
(e.g., “SHAPE” and “COLOUR”), suggesting
that, when inner speech is prevented, the difficulty
of cue–goal translation depends on cue transparency (Miyake et al., 2004).
According to Emerson and Miyake (2003;
Miyake et al., 2004), well-learned, transparent
(explicit) task cues automatically trigger related
verbal task goals and hence greatly reduce (or
even suppress) the need to rely on inner speech.
On the contrary, arbitrary cues are less efficient
at signalling the next task goal and thus must be
translated through inner speech. Similarly,
Logan and Schneider (2006) assumed that task
goals are automatically triggered by transparent
cues whereas verbal mediators (i.e., task names;
Arrington, Logan, & Schneider, 2007) are
required in the case of arbitrary cues.
The processes underlying goal setting probably
vary according to the specific features of

paradigms. Whereas goal setting depends on cue
translation in the cued task-switching paradigm,
it relies on goal retrieval, updating, and maintenance on the basis of a task sequence (e.g., alternate
on every second trial: Task A, Task A, Task B,
Task B) in the alternating-runs task-switching
paradigm. Studies conducted with adults have
shown that goal setting in such situations also
depends on inner-speech recruitment and cue
transparency (e.g., Baddeley et al., 2001; Bryck
& Mayr, 2005; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Kray
et al., 2004; Saeki & Saito, 2004). Moreover, the
close relation between goal setting and language
in this paradigm is further attested by the facilitative effect of goal-related verbalizations on switching performance in both adults (Goschke, 2000)
and school-age children (Kray, Eber, & Karbach,
2008).
Some paradigms for preschool and school-age
children require translating task cues into task
goals in the exact same way as the cued taskswitching paradigm (Advanced-DCCS, Shape
School). As children have been shown not to
recruit inner speech spontaneously and efficiently
on some memory tasks such as serial recall tasks
(e.g., Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966;
Gathercole, 1998; Halliday, Hitch, Lennon, &
Pettipher, 1990), they may encounter similar
goal-setting difficulties to those experienced by
adults under articulatory suppression. Goalsetting difficulties on paradigms such as the
Advanced DCCS and the Shape School seem all
the more probable as these paradigms use arbitrary
cues that are difficult to translate into verbal representations of task goals. Consistent with this,
5-to-6-year-old children’s performance has been
shown to increase as a function of cue transparency
on the Advanced DCCS even with no articulatory-suppression task (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009).
The structure of the Advanced DCCS (two
simple blocks, in which the same dimension is relevant across all trials, followed by a mixed block in
which dimensions alternate) allows computing
both local and mixing switch-costs. Cue transparency has been found to affect only mixing
costs—that is, the type of switch cost that
specifically targets goal setting (Rubin & Meiran,

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (2)

217

CRAGG AND CHEVALIER

2005). These results evidence that preschoolers’
set-shifting difficulties result at least partially
from goal-setting failures. In addition, a decreasing effect of cue transparency on accuracy-based
mixing costs in 7- and 9-year-olds and adults
(although they remained significant on RTs),
suggests that set-shifting progress occurring at
school age relates partially to increasingly efficient
goal-setting skills (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009). Such
goal-setting improvement is likely to be related to
the increase in inner-speech efficiency that occurs
during school age (e.g., Flavell et al., 1966),
although direct evidence of this still needs to be
reported.
The Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC)
theory (Zelazo et al., 2003) suggests that children’s
flexibility is a function of the increasing ability to
organize rules related to multiple tasks into a
single hierarchical rule structure that allows
children to determine which task is relevant and
therefore which rules must be selected. Inhibition
processes, supposedly in charge of switching task
set per se, would be entirely dependent on task
selection (Happaney & Zelazo, 2003), which is
consistent with some hypotheses that only focus
on goal setting to account for adults’ performance
in the task-switching paradigm (e.g., Schneider &
Logan, 2006; Sohn & Anderson, 2001).
It can be argued that CCC theory emphasizes
the role of goal setting, also termed task decision,
in preschoolers’ developing set-shifting skills.
However, the CCC theory fails to satisfactorily
explain at least two main phenomena regarding
goal setting. First, it cannot explain why task
decision is more difficult in the Advanced
DCCS than the standard DCCS since both paradigms are characterized by the same rule structure.
Second, if set shifting exclusively relates to task
decision (goal setting), why do children and
adults show significant local costs whereas their
computation
mode
excludes
goal-setting
demands? Consequently, it appears that the
relation between goal setting and task set switching is much more complex than is hypothesized
by the CCC theory.
In summary, goal setting, deciding which task
is relevant, is an important prerequisite of
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switching task. It does not feature in the specific
switching process, rather it occurs on every trial
in situations where more than one task may be relevant. Research with adults has shown that goal
setting is supported by inner speech and is affected
by the transparency of the cues used to signal the
upcoming task. A lack of spontaneous inner
speech may explain why young children struggle
with goal setting; however, further research is
needed to probe the relationship between goal
setting and inner speech in children more directly.
Overcoming the previously relevant task
One of the early theories to explain switch costs on
the task-switching paradigm in adults, termed task
set inertia (TSI; Allport et al., 1994) proposed that
persisting involuntary activation of a previous task
set remained after that task had been performed
and interfered with performance of the current
task. Allport et al. ran an experiment in which a
group of participants were asked to switch
between naming the colour of Stroop stimuli and
stating the numerosity (how many there were) of
a group of identical digits (i.e., ignoring the
value of the digit). No switch cost was evident in
this condition; however, when the participants
were then asked to switch between reading the
word of the Stroop stimuli and naming the value
of the digits, large switch costs became apparent.
These were attributed to interference effects
from persisting activation of the irrelevant task
that had previously been performed. This persisting activation decays with time, shown by the
fact that increasing the time between trials
reduces the switch cost (Allport et al., 1994;
Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000).
In addition to persisting proactive interference
from the previous trial, research in adults has
shown that stimuli can also re-elicit irrelevant
task sets due to stimulus – set binding. If a certain
stimulus is associated with Task A in some trials,
that stimulus will activate the task set for Task A
even when Task B is being performed, creating
interference and slowing performance. As a
result, switch costs are increased for stimuli that
have previously been associated with the alternative task set (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Gilbert &
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Shallice, 2002; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport,
2003).
Waszak et al. (2003) found that stimulus-based
priming occurred for congruent as well as incongruent stimuli, suggesting that priming occurs at
the task level and is not confined to specific stimulus – response associations. However, it has been
proposed that with a small stimulus set, as used
with children, there is less need to engage task
set level processes as the experiment progresses,
due to associative learning strengthening the
more basic stimulus –response mappings (Kray &
Eppinger, 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995).
Indeed, Kray and Eppinger (2006) found a
greater reduction in switch costs with practice for
a set size of 4 stimuli (animal and nonanimal
words of one or two syllables) compared to a set
size of 96. The influence of set size on switch
costs has not been addressed in children;
however, it would be an interesting issue to
pursue as it may provide some insight on the
extent to which children employ task-level representations when switching, compared to lower
level item-specific stimulus – response mappings.
The effect of TSI on school-aged children’s
ability to switch tasks was explored by Cepeda
et al. (2001) using the task-switching paradigm.
They found that increasing the time between
trials (while controlling for preparation time)
reduced switch costs in adults, but not in children
(aged 10 years and above). This suggests that children and adolescents experience greater interference from the persisting activation of previous,
irrelevant, task set activations than do adults.
A similar concept to the task set inertia theory
has been introduced to account for 3-year-olds’
perseveration on the DCCS. Based on evidence
that labelling the relevant dimension in the postswitch phase improves switching performance and
leaving the sorted cards face up impairs switching
performance, Diamond and Kirkham (2005;
Kirkham et al., 2003) argue that children err
because of attentional inertia—that is, because
their attention is captured by the dimension relevant in the previous task, hence activating formerly
relevant representations of the stimuli. However,
contrary to Allport’s theory that activation of the

previous task is due to involuntary priming effects
(e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000),
Kirkham et al. (2003) postulate that attentional
inertia is due to a difficulty actively inhibiting the
previously relevant dimension. Diamond (e.g.,
2006) argues that inhibition is one of the two
main contributors to flexibility. She equates flexibility with a complex executive function that is
involved in situation with working-memory
demand to maintain two tasks in an active state
and inhibition to switch from one task to the other.
The role of inhibition has also been highlighted
by Bialystok (1999) who additionally suggested
that inhibition demands are modulated by task
complexity and related analysis demands. More
precisely, flexible behaviour would be easier to
engage in when the task to switch to only necessitates processing perceptual features of stimuli
rather than when it requires identifying and interpreting semantic features. Consistent with this,
preschoolers scored better on the traditional
version of the DCCS (that involves switching
between perceptual tasks) than on a version that
required switching between semantic tasks (things
that go outside/inside and toys/clothes; Bialystok
& Martin, 2004; for convergent evidence, see
Blaye et al., 2007; Blaye & Jacques, 2009; Blaye
et al., 2006).
In summary, research in adults has shown that
persisting involuntary activation from a previous
task set, and priming of that task set from irrelevant stimulus dimensions, can interfere with performance on the currently relevant task. While in
the adult literature overcoming interference from
the previous task is thought to be one of many processes involved in shifting, it plays a central role in
some theories of preschoolers’ ability to shift tasks,
such as the attentional inertia theory. Children
may experience a greater amount of interference
than adults (Cepeda et al., 2001), however this
does not mean that it is the sole obstacle in children’s ability to shift between tasks. An important
point to consider when comparing interference in
children and adults is that the difference in the
stimuli used with children and adults may mean
that interference from the previous task is experienced in different ways in the two age groups.
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The small set sizes often used with children may
mean that interference occurs between stimulus –
response associations, rather than at a task level.
Indeed, Bialystok and Martin (2004) showed
that preschoolers did better with a traditional
colour – shape version of the DCCS than a semantic version that used 10 items. However, this confounded set size with the type of categorization the
task required (perceptual vs. conceptual), which
may also independently influence shifting performance in children. Future research should use
targeted experimental manipulations of set size
and perceptual versus categorical tasks in both
children and adults to directly address this
question.
Overcoming the previously irrelevant task
Research in adults has shown that persisting interference can also arise from the inhibition as well as
the activation of previous task sets (Allport &
Wylie, 2000; Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Mayr,
2001; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch,
2003). Mayr and Keele (2000) demonstrated this
by comparing the switch from Task B to Task A
in the sequence ABA, where Task A had just
been abandoned, to the sequence CBA, where
Task A was abandoned less recently. They found
that it was more difficult to switch in the ABA
than the CBA sequence. This is attributed to
greater persisting inhibition of Task A, which
takes time to overcome before Task A can be performed again. Mayr and Keele showed that this
inhibition is not restricted to inhibition of specific
exemplars, but occurs at an abstract task level.
Moreover, using a variant in which Task A in
the sequence ABA was not the irrelevant dimension for Task B, Mayr and Keele (Experiment 2)
demonstrated that backward inhibition is not
simply a variant of negative priming, whereby a
distractor is inhibited, slowing responses when it
becomes the target on the subsequent trial
(although greater inhibition did occur when Task
A was the distractor). Put a different way, backward inhibition reflects inhibition of the previous
task set, not simply the current distractor.
Backward inhibition has not yet been investigated in children; however, negative priming has
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been found to play a role in the DCCS. Zelazo
and colleagues (Müller, Dick, Gela, Overton, &
Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo et al., 2003, Experiments 8
and 9) showed that even when the values of the
relevant sorting dimension in the preswitch
phase (e.g., red and blue boats and rabbits,
sorting by colour) were replaced in the postswitch
phase (e.g., yellow and green boats and rabbits,
now sorting by shape) children still performed as
badly as on the standard version. As interference
from the previously relevant dimension cannot be
occurring in this case, children must be experiencing difficulty in reactivating the previously
irrelevant dimension. Furthermore, Müller et al.
(2006) showed that more 3-year-olds failed the
task when the same values of the irrelevant dimension were present on the test and target cards
during the preswitch phase (i.e., there was the
possibility of responding according to the irrelevant dimension) than when the irrelevant values
on the test card did not match the irrelevant
values on the target card. This suggests that negative priming in the DCCS “largely depends on the
presence of two possible ways of matching test and
target during the preswitch phase and on the selection of specific rules or values in the context of
competing distractors” (Müller et al., 2006,
p. 401). The revised version of the CCC theory
(CCC-r) takes these findings into account to
include the inhibition as well as the activation of
rules and also highlighting the relevance of conflict
between tasks. However, the theory still maintains
that age-related changes are due to increases in the
maximum complexity of the rules that children can
formulate, controlling the balance of activation
and inhibition between tasks in a top-down
manner.
Positive priming of the previously relevant set
and negative priming of the previously irrelevant
set have been proposed to explain the phenomena
of asymmetrical switch costs in task switching in
adults. Where two tasks are unequal in difficulty,
such as word reading (easy) and colour naming
(difficult) in the Stroop paradigm, larger costs
are often found for switching to the easier task
than for switching to the more difficult task
(Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000;
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Wylie & Allport, 2000), although only under
certain conditions (Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma,
2000; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). While this may
seem counterintuitive, it is explained by the fact
that in order to perform the more difficult task,
greater activation of this task and greater inhibition of the easier task are required in order to
overcome interference from the stronger easier
task. These need to be overcome when the stronger task is switched back to, resulting in a larger
switch cost.
Asymmetric switch costs have been demonstrated in school-aged children in task-switching
paradigms that require switching between
decisions about the colour or shape of coloured
objects. Larger switch costs are found for the
colour task, which participants find easier to
perform (Cragg & Nation, 2009; Ellefson,
Shapiro, & Chater, 2006). Interestingly, the
DCCS also employs colour and shape tasks;
however, no difference has been found in switching between the two tasks (e.g., Frye et al.,
1995). This could be due to the fact that colour
and shape tasks are equally difficult for preschoolers, or may suggest that asymmetric switch costs
only arise in situations where frequent switches
occur between the two tasks. A further possibility
is that the asymmetry between colour and shape
may be so subtle that it is conspicuous with reaction times but not with accuracy indices, especially
pass/fail criteria.
In summary, as well as persisting activation of
previous task sets, persisting inhibition also
occurs. This is demonstrated in two ways.
Backward inhibition shows that when a task
switches, the previously relevant task is inhibited,
and this inhibition then has to be overcome
when that task is performed again. Additional
inhibition is required when this task forms a distractor for the new task, as evidenced by negative
priming. Manipulations of the DCCS have
shown that negative priming influences preschoolers’ ability to switch tasks. The CCC-r theory
suggests that while this process is involved in shifting, it does not contribute to developmental
improvements in performance. However, this
hypothesis has not been explicitly tested, and it is

not known if and how changes in negative
priming may influence development in shifting.
Furthermore, no research has yet been undertaken
to explore the role that backward inhibition may
play in improvements in shifting with age.
Persisting inhibition of previous task sets is
thought to contribute to the asymmetric switch
costs seen in both adults and children when the
tasks used vary in difficulty. This issue highlights
the need to consider the relative difficulty of the
tasks on shifting performance and to control for
task difficulty if this factor is not of interest.
Moreover, the fact that the relative difficulty of
tasks may change across the lifespan, as appears
to be the case with colour and shape, and is
certainly true with colour naming and word
reading, has important implications for designing
studies that can be used with all age groups.
Which contributes more to shifting: Inhibition of the
previously relevant task or activation of the
previously irrelevant task?
A number of studies have been undertaken in
order to ascertain which provides the biggest
barrier to switching: inhibiting the previously relevant task or reactivating the previously irrelevant
task. Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) addressed
this question by presenting adult participants
with pairs of letters displayed in different colours
(e.g., a red “T” and a blue “A”) and instructing
them to indicate whether the letter in the relevant
colour was a vowel or a consonant. After a series of
trials, the relevant colour was changed. The
authors manipulated the colours displayed before
and after the switch in order to isolate, after the
switch, the difficulty of disengaging from the previously relevant colour and the difficulty of activating the newly relevant one. In the “perseveration”
version, the previously to-be-ignored colour disappeared after the switch whereas the initially relevant colour became irrelevant after the switch;
switch costs could thus only reflect the difficulty
of disengaging from the formerly relevant colour.
In the “learned irrelevance” version, the initially
relevant colour disappeared after the switch
whereas the previously irrelevant one became
relevant after the switch so that switch costs
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could only reflect the difficulty of activation of the
previously to-be-ignored colour. The results
showed that the magnitude of switch costs was
comparable across versions, suggesting that flexible
set shifting depends on both successful disengagement from previously relevant task sets and successful activation of previously irrelevant task
sets. Other studies suggest that activation of previously irrelevant task sets mainly account for
switch costs, hence leaving only a minor role to
task set disengagement (Maes, Damen, & Eling,
2004; Maes, Vitch, & Eling, 2006).
Similar mixed results have been obtained in
preschoolers. Studies on the DCCS pointed out
the equivalent contribution of failures to disengage
from the previous dimension and failed activation
of the newly relevant dimension to 3-year-olds’
switching difficulty (Zelazo et al., 2003; see also
Müller et al., 2006). On the PAST, results spoke
to a greater difficulty of activating previously
ignored task sets than disengagement from initial
ones (Chevalier & Blaye, 2008). In sum, the
studies led on both adults and preschool children
converged to the conclusion that set shifting at
least partially relies on activation of previously irrelevant information, while disengagement from
previously relevant information is also challenging.
The studies reported in this section provide
compelling evidence that a number of processes
contribute to successful shifting. In turn, this has
a tremendous impact on how preschoolers’ lack of
flexibility is construed. Preschoolers’ lack of flexibility was thought to reflect failure to disengage
from processing previously relevant information at
a cognitive level (whether this failed disengagement
result from immature inhibition or other factors;
see Chevalier & Blaye, 2006; Garon, Bryson, &
Smith, 2008, for reviews of these factors), triggering perseveration at the behavioural level (i.e.,
repetition of previous correct but now incorrect
responses). Instead, evidence for difficulty activating previously irrelevant tasks shows that at least
part of preschoolers’ difficulty is not perseverative
in nature. This highlights the need to distinguish
between perseverative processing and perseverative
outcomes, as the latter is not necessarily caused by
the former (Chevalier & Blaye, 2008).
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The fact that activating the previously irrelevant task and inhibiting the previously relevant
task appear to contribute approximately equally
in both children and adults suggests that the relative importance of these processes does not change
with age. However, for overcoming both previously relevant and previously irrelevant task
sets, an unresolved issue concerns the extent to
which these involve passive priming effects versus
active control processes. Difficulty reactivating
previously irrelevant task sets has been thought
to result from negative-priming phenomena that,
in turn, are often assumed to be related to active
inhibition (e.g., Tipper, 2001). Yet, activation
failure evidence in 3-year-olds (Chevalier &
Blaye, 2008; Müller et al., 2006; Zelazo et al.,
2003) and negative-priming evidence even in 18month-olds (Amso & Johnson, 2005) whose
inhibitory control is immature suggest that activation failures may instead relate to automatic
phenomena (see also Maes et al., 2004). Indeed,
negative priming has been proposed to result
from episodic retrieval processes (Neill, 1997) or
automatic inhibition (Harnishfeger, 1995).
While both passive and active processes are likely
to be involved, the relative influence of these has
important implications for the extent to which
set shifting is considered an “executive” process.
One way to determine the balance between
passive and active processes is to study developmental trajectories. Indeed, Cepeda et al. (2001)
found that children as young as 7 years were as
likely as adults to benefit from increased preparation time to actively prepare for the upcoming
task, but that children did not benefit from a
longer interval to overcome interference from the
previous trial. This perhaps suggests that active
processes of preparation mature earlier than overcoming the passive interference from the previous
trial.
Information filtering
A well-established finding in the adult taskswitching literature is the task congruency effect
that arises due to the overlapping stimulus –
response mappings of the two tasks (e.g.,
Goschke, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Rogers &
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Monsell, 1995). Specifically, when the two dimensions of the stimuli indicate the same response
(e.g., red and boat both require a left response)
performance is faster than when the two dimensions indicate differing responses (e.g., red requires
a left response, and boat requires a right response).
This demonstrates that the irrelevant task remains
active and interferes with performance on the
current task. Congruence effects cannot be investigated in many preschool tasks as they only include
incongruent stimuli. However, a comparison of
the congruence effect in school-age children and
adults using the task-switching paradigm
(Cepeda et al., 2001) demonstrated a larger congruence effect in children, suggesting that they
experience greater interference from incongruent
stimulus – response mappings. Furthermore, a
study comparing 5- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 11year-olds suggested that this interference decreases
with age (Cragg & Nation, 2009).
A further issue regarding information filtering
concerns whether the interference largely occurs
at the level of the stimulus or at the level of the
response, which if bivalent, both contain properties of the two tasks. It is also of interest how
this conflict affects switching performance. This
question has been investigated in adults by comparing switching for univalent versus bivalent
stimuli and responses. By manipulating the
valence of both the stimuli and responses,
Meiran (2000) showed that stimulus and response
level interference have independent effects on
switch costs, with a lower switch cost when univalent stimuli and responses are used. Other
studies have failed to find an influence of stimulus
and response interference on switch costs, but do
show a reduction in mixing or global costs when
univalent stimuli and responses are used (Mayr,
2001; Mayr & Bryck, 2007; Rubin & Meiran,
2005). This suggests that interference between
tasks needs to be resolved on all trials in mixed
blocks, not just on switch trials.
The influence of interference at the level of the
stimulus and the response has also been investigated in children. Perner and Lang (2002) found
that children performed better in a “same – silly”
version of the DCCS than in the standard

DCCS when univalent test cards were used. In
the same – silly version, children are instructed, in
the postswitch phase, to keep sorting according
to the same dimension (e.g., shape) but this time
to put the test cards with the “wrong” target
(e.g., boats with the rabbit target and rabbits
with the boat target). Children were also better
on the same– silly version with bivalent cards
when the second dimension did not form a task
(Kloo, Perner, Kerschluber, Dabernig, &
Aichhorn, 2008a). This suggests that the difficulty
lies with conflict between tasks rather than simply
a problem of selectively attending to one dimension, although this may also play a role (Brooks,
Hanauer, Padowska, & Rosman, 2003). Some
researchers have taken advantage of the fact that
spatially separating the dimensions reduces the
conflict between them (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970;
Shepp & Barrett, 1991) by presenting children
with cards showing either a coloured circle and
adjacent outline of the shape (Kloo & Perner,
2005) or a black shape on a coloured card
(Diamond, Carlson, & Beck, 2005). Consistent
with theories that difficulties on the DCCS are
caused by redescribing stimuli (Kloo & Perner,
2005; Perner & Lang, 2002) or disengaging from
the previous dimension (e.g., Kirkham et al.,
2003), separating the dimensions in this way
improved switching performance in preschoolers.
It appeared, however, that separating the dimensions on the test cards but not the target cards
caused this improvement (Kloo & Perner, 2005).
This suggests that children are more influenced
by interference at the stimulus level than at the
response level. Further evidence for this comes
from the fact that separating the target locations
so that there are four boxes, two for each task,
does not improve preschoolers’ performance on
the DCCS (Rennie, Bull, & Diamond, 2004;
Towse, Redbond, Houston-Price, & Cook,
2000). Interestingly, recent eye-tracking data
have shown that from 4 years on, children’s fixations on responses on the Advanced DCCS are
very scarce as compared to fixations on the stimulus (Chevalier et al., 2009a), perhaps explaining
why interference at this level has a greater effect
on children’s performance.
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In a version of the task-switching paradigm
used with older children, separating responses was
found to help 9- to 11-year-olds but not 5- to 7year-olds switch task (Cragg & Nation, 2009,
Experiment 2), perhaps indicating that the level
at which conflict causes most difficulty may
change with age. In contrast to the work with preschoolers, separating the stimulus dimensions by
placing the shape on a coloured background
increased stimulus-level conflict in this study, particularly for the 5- to 7-year-olds. A similar
finding has also been demonstrated with the
Garner interference paradigm (Ridderinkhof, van
der Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997) and a switching
paradigm in adults (Kloo, Perner, Trendl,
Schmidhuber, & Aichhorn, 2008b). The reasons
for this discrepancy between preschoolers and
older children are unclear and warrant further investigation, particularly as this seems to be one area in
which the processes underlying flexibility may
undergo considerable changes during development.
In addition to interference between dimensions
of the stimuli and between the responses, there is
an additional level of conflict in the DCCS
between the test cards (e.g., red boats and blue
rabbits) and the target cards (e.g., blue boats and
red rabbits) as they only match on one dimension.
Some authors have postulated that children
encounter set-shifting difficulty because of the
visual conflict that arises between the bidimensional test and target cards (Garon et al., 2008;
Perner & Lang, 2002) based on evidence that children’s performance was found to improve when
the bidimensional target cards were replaced with
puppets. There are many pitfalls to this interpretation, however. First, spatially dissociating the
dimensions on the target cards (Kloo & Perner,
2005) and using univalent responses (Rennie
et al., 2004; Towse et al., 2000) also reduce conflict
between test and target cards; however, this does
not improve performance on the task. Second,
set-shifting difficulties are observed on other paradigms such as the PAST in which responses are
unidimensional (Chevalier & Blaye, 2008) and
the Shape School in which the responses must be
given verbally (Espy, 1997). In such paradigms
the response options do not visually conflict with
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the stimuli, and their meanings do not change as
a function of the relevant task. These results
suggest that visual conflict between stimuli and
responses is not necessary to observe set-shifting
difficulties in preschoolers. Instead, it seems that
preschoolers encounter shifting difficulties whenever there is conflict among several possible
responses to stimuli (whether or not the materialization of such responses visually conflict with
stimuli). The fact that the use of puppets improves
children’s performance may be due to alternative
reasons, such as helping to conceptualize the task
or making the rules easier to remember.
Congruence effects demonstrate the importance
of overcoming conflict in shifting paradigms,
whether this occurs at the level of the stimulus,
response, or in the DCCS, between test and
target cards. Although congruence effects have
not been directly measured in preschoolers,
studies in older children and adults indicate that
the ability to resolve conflict shows considerable
improvement during development. Furthermore,
the differential effects of spatially separating
stimuli and responses in preschoolers, school-age
children, and adults suggest that conflict may be
experienced in different ways at different ages.
This is one aspect of switching that has been
studied across different age groups; however, the
exact nature of these changes and how they
influence the development of flexibility are still
not understood. Theories of shifting development
also need to be adapted to incorporate these
developmental changes. The redescription and
attentional inertia theories both explain the obstacle
that stimulus conflict poses to preschoolers. Yet if
preschoolers become able to switch task because
they become able to redescribe the stimuli, why
do older children and adults still struggle with
stimulus conflict? Similarly, if improvements in
shifting are due to changes in attentional inertia,
how can the influence of response conflict be
explained?
Goal maintenance and monitoring
In the paradigms used with younger preschoolers
(DCCS, PAST), goal-management demands are
greatly reduced by task switches being explicitly
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announced and the relevant task being repeated
before every trial. Although such situations do
not require children to decide on their own
which task is relevant, they may be demanding in
terms of goal maintenance. Marcovitch,
Boseovski, and Knapp (2007) showed that 4- to
5-year-olds’ performance on the DCCS can be
decreased with the introduction of nonconflicting
trials (i.e., colour and shape lead to the same
responses). The authors interpret this result in
terms of goal neglect—that is, disregard of task
requirements despite understanding and remembering them (Duncan, Emslie, Williams,
Johnson, & Freer, 1996). They showed that
when the series of postswitch trials mainly
included nonconflicting trials, children progressively tended to neglect the new task goal (i.e.,
respond on the basis of the newly relevant dimension). Yet, goal neglect is detrimental for conflicting trials in which the two dimensions lead to
different responses. By contrast, when the postswitch trials were mainly conflicting, the children
had to refer to the new task goal to respond correctly, which helped them to actively maintain it.
As goal maintenance depends on workingmemory capacity, and working memory develops
over the preschool period (e.g., Carlson, 2005),
3-year-old children may encounter goal-maintenance difficulty on the standard DCCS even though
all trials are conflicting. Consistent with this,
DCCS performance has been shown to be positively correlated with a task that favours goal
neglect (Towse, Lewis, & Knowles, 2007).
Further evidence that maintenance is linked to
set-shifting performance comes from Cepeda and
Munakata (2007), who observed that children
who correctly switched on the DCCS answered
knowledge questions (e.g., “In the colour game,
where do red ones go?”) more quickly than perseverators did. According to the authors, these
quicker responses reflect the higher strength with
which switchers can actively maintain a representation of the newly relevant dimension as
compared with perseverators, suggesting that
maintenance capacity plays an important role in
set shifting. These results are in line with
Morton and Munakata’s (2002; Munakata, 2001)

active/latent representation theory, which
assumes that set shifting is dependent on the relative strength of active representations of the task to
be switched to and the latent representation of the
task to be abandoned. According to this theory,
set-shifting development would be a function of
age-related increase in active-memory resources.
Failures of goal maintenance have been indexed
using nonperseverative errors and more specifically
failures-to-maintain-set errors and distraction
errors (e.g., Barceló & Knight, 2002). When
tested on a version of the PAST with three
response options that allowed distinguishing
between perseverative and distraction errors, 3year-olds were found to commit as many distraction as perseverative errors, suggesting that their
difficulties on that paradigm relates at least partially to goal-maintenance failures (Chevalier &
Blaye, 2008). On the WCST and WCST-like
paradigms in which task goals must be set and
maintained on the basis of feedback, distraction
errors have been shown to follow a different
developmental path from that of perseverative
errors (e.g., Crone et al., 2004; Somsen, 2007).
In particular, Crone et al. (2004) observed
that perseverative errors attained adult levels by
11– 12 years of age whereas distraction errors
kept decreasing until 13– 15 years.
Furthermore, 4- to 6-year-olds’ performance on
an inductive version of the PAST, in which the
relevant colour had to be discovered on the basis
of feedback, was found to improve throughout
phases (i.e., colour changes), especially for older
children (Chevalier, Dauvier, & Blaye, 2009b).
This result suggests that preschoolers benefit
from previous experience on the PAST to better
process feedback, leading to increasingly efficient
goal setting and maintenance on subsequent
phases (e.g., having experienced on the first
phases that a colour remained relevant for a
whole series of trials, children may be inclined to
strongly maintain the goal of a newly relevant
colour on following phases). Consequently, it
appears that feedback-based goal setting and
maintenance progresses not only with age but
also with experience with the switching context
at a given age.
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Task-goal maintenance in complex situations in
which the relevant task must be ascertained on the
basis of feedback is intrinsically related to monitoring control requirements and making necessary
adjustments in behaviour. There is evidence to
suggest that a monitoring difficulty may substantially contribute to children’s difficulty with the
WCST. Schouten, Oostrom, Peters, Verloop, and
Jennekens-Schinkel (2000) found that with a
simplified version of the WCST 4- to 10-year-old
children did not appear to perseverate but instead
adopted a trial-and-error approach to switching,
suggesting that they were not monitoring performance cues. In addition, Crone et al. (2004) found
that indicating the rule change attenuated perseverative responding in 8- to 9-year-olds on a task
that involved switching stimulus – response mappings. From this they suggested that perseverative
errors in the WCST may reflect children’s failure
to monitor performance feedback when switches
are not explicitly cued, rather than a failure to
switch attention away from the previous task.
Very young children may struggle to monitor
performance even in situations where switching
is explicitly announced. Bohlmann and Fenson
(2005) showed that 3-year-olds’ performance can
be greatly improved on the DCCS by explicit feedback on the postswitch phase of the DCCS that
clearly indicates that their responses are no
longer relevant for the goal to be reached. This
helps children to understand that they must
behave differently (see also Deák, 2003; Kloo &
Perner, 2005, for arguments in favour of children’s
misunderstanding of the mismatch between
instructions and their responses on the DCCS).
In contrast to the task-switching paradigm,
paradigms such as the WCST and the DCCS
have a number of trials between switches,
meaning that the currently relevant task must be
maintained. Difficulties in maintaining the relevant task, as evidenced by distraction errors and
poorer performance on knowledge questions,
appear to contribute to preschoolers difficulties
with the task, as suggested by the active/latent representation theory (Morton & Munakata, 2002;
Munakata, 2001). In addition to task maintenance,
monitoring of performance in situations where the
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task must be deduced on the basis of feedback also
seems to pose difficulties for children. These findings are particularly important in that they stress
that cognitive flexibility is not confined to switching processes in response to relevant environmental
cues but it also encompasses maintenance of a given
task set in the face of irrelevant environmental cues.
Yet, this maintenance aspect of flexibility is often
overlooked. The investigation of nonperseverative
errors, derived from the literature on the WCST,
has clearly shown that children’s lack of flexibility
partly relates to failure to maintain a task set after
successfully switching to it. This difficulty once
again suggests that there is much more to flexibility
development than an increasing ability to override
perseveration.

Conclusions and future directions
In summary, it can be seen that many of the processes involved in shifting in adults are also
employed when children switch between tasks. In
contrast to a widespread idea (e.g., Miyake et al.,
2000) research in adults and children has shown
that cognitive flexibility or task switching cannot
be reduced to a single shifting process. Instead,
flexibility appears to be underpinned by an array
of processes: some being related to task decision/
goal setting and others to shifting task sets per
se; some being intentional in nature and others
being automatic. Once a decision to switch is
made, and the relevant task set is selected, persisting patterns of positive and negative priming from
the previous task must be overcome while inhibiting the previously relevant task set and reactivating
the previously irrelevant task set. Conflict from the
stimulus– response mappings of the irrelevant task
must also be filtered out and the currently relevant
task then maintained until the next switch.
The present review has emphasized that work
conducted on adults’ flexibility can enrich the
understanding of the mechanisms driving developmental changes. In particular, the fact that costs
related to switching tasks do not exclusively
reflect the difficulty of disengaging from the previously relevant task casts into doubt the dominant
claim that preschoolers’ lack of flexibility results
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only from perseverative tendencies. Indeed, in
addition to the specific process of switching and
implementing the new task, research on the taskswitching paradigm and the Advanced DCCS
has identified the essential role of goal setting
and maintenance for flexible behaviour. As evidenced by a larger influence on mixing costs than
local switch costs, these processes seem to be
involved in most situations requiring executive
control, not simply when a switch in task is
required. This demonstrates that flexibility is not
just about switching.
The developmental studies reviewed have also
informed our understanding of the end-state of
shifting development in adults. Identifying diverging developmental trajectories for processes,
such as preparation for the upcoming task versus
dissipation of previous interference (Cepeda
et al., 2001), perseverative versus nonperseverative
errors (Chevalier & Blaye, 2008), or rule representation versus task set suppression (Crone et al.,
2006), shows that these are separable, independent
processes and consequently thus helps to formulate
hypotheses about how these processes interact.
Developmental studies can also generate testable
predictions for adult research. According to
Bialystok (1999), it is easier to selectively attend
to perceptual properties that are generally relatively simple and readily available, rather than
semantic properties that are complex and need
interpretation to be identified. Therefore, conceptual aspects (here, stimulus complexity) are
assumed to directly influence executive processes
such as inhibition. Alternatively, it may be
argued that conceptual aspects influence flexibility
through goal setting because it is especially difficult to build a strong representation of the goal
to be reached when this goal is hardly conceptualized. These hypotheses could be tested in adults
using the task-switching paradigm, which allows
identification of the processes related to either
goal setting or switching through the computation
of mixing costs and local costs, respectively.
This review has shown that flexibility is a
complex executive function that taps into other
widely acknowledged cognitive control mechanisms: inhibition and working memory. Many

results speak to the involvement of inhibition in
task switching, and goal setting has been shown
to be closely related to working memory (Gruber
& Goschke, 2004; Miyake et al., 2004). This is
consistent with Diamond’s (2006) claim that flexibility requires the combination of working
memory and inhibition. However, as our review
points out, flexibility cannot be reduced to the conjunction of demands on working memory, to
actively maintain two task goals, and on inhibition,
to override the previous task set. Instead, the
relations between flexibility and each of these
executive functions are much more complex and
involve multiple processes. However, studying
the development of shifting and how this relates
to changes in working memory and inhibitory
skills is undoubtedly a useful way to determine
the extent to which shifting does rely on inhibitory
and memory processes. Furthermore, given that
shifting incorporates working memory and inhibition, research on task switching not only furthers
our understanding of the processes underlying
flexibility and its development but also provides
promising ways to further examine other executive
functions.
In conclusion, the current literature demonstrates that similar processes underlie flexibility
in both children and adults; however, we still
know very little about how these processes
change with age and which have the most influence on shifting development. For example, does
the passive interference from positive and negative
priming of previous tasks get weaker with age, or
do the control processes required to overcome
these get stronger? A further question that needs
to be answered concerns whether qualitative
changes take place, or if developmental improvements are simply quantitative. Given the similarity
of the processes involved between children and
adults, many of the changes may be quantitative.
However, research into the role of perceptual,
stimulus-level, and response-level conflict suggests
that qualitative changes in the locus of interference
between tasks may occur. Moreover, young children may face additional conceptual demands
that are not a problem for older children and
adults, such as the ability to see the same item in
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different ways (Kloo & Perner, 2003). This is
probably the case of 3-year-old children who are
often unable to implement a single explicitly
announced switch, as in the DCCS, but benefit
from different parameter variations that disambiguate the necessity to forsake previously relevant
behaviours.
Future research into the development of flexibility needs to combine experimental methodology
with a developmental approach in order to understand how the processes involved in flexible thinking change with age. Additionally, more studies
are needed with school-age children and adolescents in order to bridge the gap between the existing preschool and adult literatures. The use of
paradigms such as the Advanced DCCS, which
contain features of both the DCCS and taskswitching paradigms, will aid in this endeavour.
But there is also scope for the development of
new paradigms that are suitable for use with different age groups. Importantly, there is a need to
acknowledge the range of processes that shifting
involves and begin to explore the relationships
between these, rather than continue to pursue
the single explanation theories that have dominated the field so far.
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